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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-Stay of Bankruptcy Proceedings
Denied to Creditor Seeking Lien on Exempt
Property-Harris v. Hoffman*
The appellants, husband and wife, executed a promissory note to
the appellee-bank. Thereafter, they purchased real property which
they occupied as a homestead. Acting pursuant to an Iowa statute
which subjects a homestead to debts contracted before the homestead
was acquired,1 the bank commenced a suit on the note in state court,
but this proceeding was stayed when appellants filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.2 After the trustee in bankruptcy set the homestead apart as property exempt under Iowa law,3 the bank sought a
stay of discharge in bankruptcy for a reasonable period of time so
that it could obtain a lien on the homestead in the state court.4 The
referee refused, but the federal district court overruled him and
granted the stay. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, held, reversed. Bankruptcy proceedings should
not be stayed to permit a creditor to obtain a post-bankruptcy lien
when one obtained by him before bankruptcy would be subject to
avoidance under section 67a(I) of the Bankruptcy Act5 or preservation under section 67a(3) of that Act. 6
• 879 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1967) [hereinafter referred to as the principal case].
1, IOWA CoDE ANN. § 561.21 (1950):
Debts for which homestead liable.
The homestead may be sold to satisfy debts of each of the following classes:
1. Those contracted prior to its acquisition but then only to satisfy a deficiency
remaining after exhausting the other property of the debtor, liable to execution.
2. The petition was filed pursuant to § Ila of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 29(a)
(1964).
3, IOWA CODE ANN, § 561.16 (1950).
4. Appellee relied mainly on Lockwood v. Exchange Banlc, 190 U.S. 294 (1908), and
Duffy v. Tegler, 19 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1927).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(l) (1964):
Liens and fraudulent transfers.
Every lien against the :property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or eqmtable process or ~roceedings within four months before
the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against such
person shall be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent • • . .
6. 11 U.S.C. § 107{a){l!) (1964):
The property affected by any lien deemed null and void under the provisions
of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision (a) shall be discharged from such
lien and such property and any of the indemnifying property transferred to or
for the benefit of a surety shall pass to the trustee or debtor, as the case may be,
except that the court may on due notice order any such lien to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate, and the court may direct such conveyances as may be
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Two Supreme Court decisions decided shortly after the tum of
the century have resulted in some disagreement as to whether a
creditor should be granted a stay to proceed against exempt property
in situations like the principal case. In Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,1
the Supreme Court held that the enforceability of creditors' claims
against exempt property must be determined in nonbankruptcy
courts.8 The Court recognized that the Bankruptcy Act gives the
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to determine whether property is
exempt, but held that this does not mean that those courts can adjudicate claims against such property.9 This conclusion did not,
however, foreclose the creditor in the Lockwood case from relief.
Although the creditor had no lien on the exempt property he was
pursuing, the debtor had previously signed a valid waiver of his
statutory exemption, and the Court held that the creditor was entitled to a reasonable postponement of discharge so that he could
establish a lien against the debtor's exempt property in the state
court.10 Prior to the principal case, courts generally did not restrict
the granting of stays under the Lockwood doctrine to cases in which
the creditor held a contractual waiver; 11 they also granted stays to
creditors asserting statutory rights to exempt property not founded
on waiver of the exemption.
Ten years after Lockwood was decided, an opinion was handed
down by the Supreme Court which made the scope of the Lockwood
proper or adequate to evidence the title thereto of the trustee or debtor, as the
case may be •.••
As an alternate ground for its decision the court concluded that the granting of a
stay would be futile under the circumstances in as much as Iowa law would not
recognize the bank's claim in a proceeding to establish a post-bankruptcy lien. Principal
case at 418-19. This alternate holding relied on Bracewell v. Hughes, 214 Iowa 241, 242
N.W. 66 (1932), in which the court differentiated between a post-bankruptcy suit to
enforce an existing lien and a post-bankruptcy suit to create a lien, holding that the
latter action could not be maintained under Iowa law. For a critical examination of
the court's reasoning in Bracewell, see Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. R.Ev. 445, at 469-71, n.117 (1960).
7. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
8. Some lower courts had previously allowed bankruptcy courts to adjudicate claims
against exempt property of the debtor. See, e.g•• In re Boyd, 120 F. 999 (N.D. Iowa
1903); In re Sisler, 96 F. 402 (W.D. Va. 1899); In re Woodruff, 96 F. 317 (S.D. Ga. 1899).
See generally 1 w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1f 6.05, at 809 (1967).
9. 190 U.S. at 299-300.
10. Id. at 300.
11. See, e.g., Duffy v. Tegler, 19 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1927) (distinguished in principal
case), which held that a bankruptcy court should stay proceedings for a reasonable
period in order to allow a creditor alleging that under state law a homestead was not
exempt as to him to pursue his claim in a state court. Accord, In re Rabb, 21 F.2d 254
(N.D. Tex. 1927), reu'd on other grounds, 29 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1929): Westerman
Lumber Co. v. Rashke, 172 Minn. 198, 215 N.W. 197 (1927). For a recent case following
this interpretation of Lockwood, see In re Sokatch, 208 F, Supp. 789 (E.D,N.Y. 1962),
holding that a judgment creditor was entitled to a stay in order to proceed against
goods of the bankrupt which were exempt as to the trustee, but not as to him. See
generally I w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1[ 6.05, at 812-18 (1967).
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decision uncertain. In Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railway v.
Hall,1 2 the Court held that former section 67£ of the Bankruptcy
Act13 could be used by a bankrupt to avoid liens obtained on property which was exempt under state law. Section 67a(l), the statutory
successor to section 67£, which provides for the avoidance of liens
obtained within the four-month period immediately preceding the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy, now codifies the rule of the Hall
case. 14 As the court pointed out in the principal case, the policy of
the Hall case, and of the Bankruptcy Act as it now reads, runs
counter to that of the Lockwood doctrine insofar as that doctrine
entitles creditors to stays in bankruptcy proceedings to enable them
to establish a lien against exempt property in cases other than where
there has been a waiver of exemption. For example, suppose an
attachment lien obtained by a creditor against a homestead within
the £our-month period preceding bankruptcy is avoided by the bankrupt under section 67a(l). The creditor thereafter might ask for a
Lockwood stay in order to obtain a new lien by judgment or execution against the exempt property in a nonbankruptcy court. If the
bankruptcy court should allow the creditor to do this, the purpose of
avoiding the pre-bankruptcy lien under section 67a(l) would be
frustrated. 15 As a practical matter, there is little evidence that this
"merry-go-round" has ever developed.16 No case has been found in
12. 229 U.S. 511 (1913),
13, At that time § 67f read:
[A]ll liens ••• obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is inliOlvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a
bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, attachment, or other lien shall
be deemed wholly discharged from the same and shall pass to the trustee as a part
of the estate of the bankrupt.
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67f, 30 Stat. 564.
14. See text of § 67a(l) quoted in note 5 supra. For a discussion of § 67a(l), see
4 W. CoLLIER, BANKRUl'TCY ,I 67.01-.55, at 815-40 (1967),
15. But see Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGE\15
L. REv, 678, 717-18 (1960), in which the author takes the position that there is no
inconsistency between Lockwood and § 67a. Countryman contends that Lockwood stays
are available to creditors whose underlying claims are excepted frolll the exemption
statutes. (See note 11 supra and accompanying text for a discussioJl of this conception
of Lockwood.) Therefore, when such a creditor obtains a lien on the otherwise exempt
property within four months of bankruptcy, § 67a(l) should not be used to invalidate
the lien, as the creditor can levy under his execution and obtain a postbankruptcy lien
which § 67a could not reach.
16. Although both Kennedy, supra note 6, at 467, and Comment, Bankruptcy
Exemptions: Critique and Suggestiorn, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, at 1486 (1959), make reference
to the "merry-go-round" problem, only one instance of such a result is mentioned~
Northern Shoe v. Cecka, 22 N.D. 631, 135 N.W. 177 (1912). This case held that a
creditor seeking to recover the purchase price of goods was not barred from obtaining
a new lien on exempt property after bankruptcy, although he had previously
abandoned a pre-bankruptcy lien which could have been avoided under § 67a, There
are several factors that might explain why this result has not occurred more often.
First, there are not many instances in which creditors can obtain liens against exempt
property by judicial proceedings. Second, few creditors seek a Lockwood order to
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which a bankrupt actually argued that this use of a Lockwood stay
would be inconsistent with section 67a. The court in the principal
case, however, did recognize this possible conflict and as a result
denied the bank's application for a stay.
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act17 requires that the variety of
exemptions granted by state and federal nonbankruptcy law and
duly claimed by the bankrupt18 be recognized in bankruptcy proceedings.19 The states have varying exemption statutes, and in
addition, most states except varying classes of creditors from the
operation of the exemptions.20 In a few jurisdictions creditors may
also protect themselves from the effect of exemption statutes by
obtaining contractual waivers from their debtors.21 Differing views
have developed on whether state law pertaining to exceptions to
obtain a lien when they have been unsuccessful in establishing one prior to filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Third, if the creditor has obtained a pre-bankruptcy lien,
there are few situations where the bankrupt has avoided that lien by use of section
67a, thus forcing the creditor to seek a Lockwood stay.
17. 11 u.s.c. § 24 (1964).
18. There are no automatic exemptions in bankruptcy; they must be claimed,
ordinarily by the bankrupt, under § 7a(8) of the Act. 11 U.S.C. § 25a(8) (1964).
19. The first two bankruptcy acts, enated in 1800 and 1841, provided for a national
exemption without regard to state law. The third act, passed in 1867, gave effect to
state exemption law when that law gave a higher exemption than provided for in the
federal act. Finally, in 1898, after the panic of 1893, state law became the primary reference for determining exemptions, there being no federal minimum. See generally 1 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUl'TCY 1J 6.01, at 793 (1967); Countryman, supra note 15 at 680-84;
Comment, supra note 16, at 1461-62, 1509.
State exemption laws vary widely from state to state, and the resulting lack of uniformity in the rights of creditors against bankrupts' estates has generated discussion as
to the propriety of these variations. See Kennedy, supra note 6; Comment, supra note
16. Although it has frequently been suggested that a uniform federal exemption law is
desirable, any federal standard would certainly be attacked as either too generous with
or too strict on debtors. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 452; Comment, supra note 16,
at 1509. Should such a national law reduce the state-determined exemptions presently
allowable in bankruptcy, it might also be criticized as a subversion of state policy as
to the necessity of certain exemptions to preserve the family unit from dependence on
state support. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 451. Furthermore, such a uniform national
law would induce creditors to invoke involuntary bankruptcy, thus giving them a
weapon against debtors seeking to assert through non-bankruptcy proceedings exemp•
tions granted by state law. Conversely, a national minimum above that prescribed by
state law would give debtors a new reason for filing voluntary bankruptcy petitionsa prospect not likely to be viewed with favor by Congress, the bankruptcy judges, or
the business-credit community. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 451.
20. This is the type of statute relied upon by the bank in the principal case. See
note 1 supra. For other examples, see note lll infra.
21. Most states do not allow waiver on public policy grounds. This is true even
in creditor-oriented states like New York [Kneetle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249 (1860)] as
well as in the debtor-conscious western states such as Iowa [Curtis v. O'Brien, 20 Iowa
376 (1866)], Kentucky [Moxley v. Ragan, 73 Ky. 156 (1873)], and Wisconsin [Maxwell
v. Reed, 7 Wis. 582 (1859)]. See also s. THOMPSON, HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS § 441,
at 385 (1878). Even Georgia, which recognizes the validity of waivers in her constitution, will not allow the debtor to waive his exemption for wearing apparel and a $300
minimum of furniture and food. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1101 (1937). See also Kennedy,
supra note 6, at 468-69.
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exemptions should be incorporated into federal bankruptcy policy.22
If the exceptions are included, the bankrupt will not be able to avoid
a lien on the exempt property by use of section 67a(l), and the
trustee will not have the right to preserve the lien for the benefit of
the estate.23 If, however, these exceptions are not incorporated into
federal bankruptcy policy, the bankrupt will be able to avoid a lien
on his exempt property.
There are valid policy reasons for denying creditors the opportunity to take advantage of state exceptions to exemptions after
bankruptcy or within four months preceding the filing of the petition. One can argue that the underlying policies of ratable distribution of the bankrupt's estate and relief of the bankrupt from his
burden of debt would be violated if certain creditors could satisfy
their claims in full by obtaining stays and pursuing the bankrupt's
exempt property in a nonbankruptcy court.24 Stays of discharge
proceedings might promote races of diligence among those creditors
who can take advantage of an exception. If one or more such creditors
rush to obtain liens on the same exempt property before other creditors who are also excepted from the exemption can get anything, the
result would be clearly antagonistic to the Bankruptcy Act's policy of
ratable distribution to all creditors of the same class.25 Moreover, a
stay of discharge puts the creditors holding a waiver or a special right
as to exempt property in a better position than other unsecured
creditors, for he can share in the distribution of the bankrupt's
estate and also proceed against the bankrupt's exempt property.26 A
further objection to the practice of granting stays is that it denies the
debtor the benefit of a prompt determination of his right to discharge
and is therefore contrary to the congressional policy favoring the
expedition of bankruptcy proceedings.27 Finally, exempt property of
the bankrupt may be subject to the control of state courts pending
the outcome of the state court litigation; when the exempt property
consists of such articles as the tools of the debtor's trade or his auto22. Compare id. at 462, with Countryman, supra note 15, and Comment, supra note
16, at 1483-86.
23. See § 67a{3) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(3) (1964), quoted in
pertinent part in note 6 supra.
24. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 462-67.
25. Id. at 468.
26. A creditor holding a consensual waiver that is supported by a security interest
must generally accept deduction of the value of the security from the amount of his
allowable claim in bankruptcy, although there is conflict in this area. See 1 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1[ 1.28, at 130.8 (1967); Kennedy, supra note 6, at 463-64.
27. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1965). The bankruptcy court is
required to set a time for filing of objections to the discharge, and if no such objections
are forthcoming, then the bankrupt is discharged. For a discussion of this procedure,
see l W. CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 'ii 14.03-.15, at 1265-314.9 (1967); Kennedy, supra note
6, at 462.
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mobile, judicial control could cause the debtor considerable detriment.211
. On the other hand, there are legitimate reasons for not permitting
either the trustee or the bankrupt to use section 67a(l) to prevent
excepted creditors from obtaining liens on exempt property either
within the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy or thereafter. 29 The Bankruptcy Act incorporates state
exemption laws in their entirety.ao Yet, when a bankruptcy court
refuses to grant a creditor a stay to obtain a lien in a nonbankruptcy
court, it in effect makes the debtor the beneficiary of a larger exemption than he was supposed to have had under state law.31 Courts, at
times, have seemingly been so impressed with this argument that they
have construed section 67a(l) to apply only to liens obtained on nonexempt property, despite the Supreme Court ruling in Hall. 32 It
should be noted in this connection that if state exemption policy is
effectuated and excepted creditors are granted stays to obtain judicial liens against exempt property, then, except for the rare case
in which the trustee would have preserved the lien for the estate, no
one is seriously prejudiced but the bankrupt, for the exempt property out of which the excepted creditor satisfies his claim is not part
of the bankrupt's estate.
Even if a judicial lien obtained within four months of bankruptcy
on exempt property can be avoided under section 67a(l), it does not
follow that the property will necessarily be set aside to the bankrupt.
Under section 67a(3),33 the bankruptcy court is authorized to preserve a lien for the benefit of the bankrupt estate. However, the
Bankruptcy Act does not indicate whether if the trustee moves to
have a lien preserved for the benefit of the estate, he can prevail over
the bankrupt's right to avoid the lien under section 67a(l). The
28. Comment, supra note 16, at 1477.
29. Id. at 1485.
30. See 3 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY tj[ 1290, at 181 (1957); Comment, supra note
16, at 1485.
31. The following classes of creditors may thereby be denied rights in exempt
property, although state statutes have attempted to give them such rights: Purchasemoney lenders [see, e.g., N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. § 5206(a) (McKinney 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 272.20 (1957)]; tort claimants [see, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 627.7 (1950)); alimony,
maintenance, and support claimants [see, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.140 (Supp, 1967);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 136 (1965)]; tax claimants [see, e.g., !ND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-3515
(Burns 1946), 64-1511 (Burns 1961); FLA. CoNsr. art. X, § l]. See generally, Joslin,
Debtors' Exemption Laws, Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, at 372-75 (1959);
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 457-58, 472-73; Comment, supra note 16, at 1469-70.
32. See, e.g., Duffy v. Tegler, 19 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1927); In re Snyder, 216 F. 989
(1914) (§ 67£ held to apply only to the bankrupt's estate); Blake v. Alswager, 55 N.D.
776, 215 N.W. 549 (1927).
33. See text quoted in note 6 supra. For a discussion of ~ 67a(3), see 4 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY tj[ 67.15-.17, at 163-93 (1967); Countryman, supra note 15, at 715-20;
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 481-84; Comment, supra note 16, at 1485; Note, Exemptions
and Section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 VA. L. REv. 83, 88-89 (1954).
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language of section 67a(3) is unclear on this point; it provides that
property relieved of a lien passes "to the trustee or debtor, as the
case may be."34 However, some light may be shed by the case of
Connell v. Walker, 35 which was decided by the Supreme Court after
the Hall decision, but before Hall was codified in the Bankruptcy
Act. In Connell the Court denied a bankrupt the right to dissolve a
lien under section 67 on the ground that if it had permitted him to
do so, the trustee's option to preserve the lien for the benefit of the
estate would have been cut off. Although an attempt has been made
to distinguish this holding from that of the Hall case,36 Connell
seems to imply that Hall should not be controlling on the issue of
whether the trustee's right to preserve prevails over the bankrupt's
right to avoid.
Although little has been written of the power of preservation conferred by section 67a(3),31 some dispute has arisen over whether it
should be employed at all in situations where the benefits of avoidance would inure to the bankrupt.38 Two courts have allowed
trustees to preserve a lien on exempt property in such a situation.39
These courts reasoned that the trustee should be subrogated to the
position of the lienholder and that the bankrupt should only be
entitled to claim the equity above the amount of the lien. It is submitted that the trustee should be allowed to assert the rights of
creditors in this situation, for that result is most consistent with the
general purpose of section 67a to benefit the bankrupt estate. If this
position is adopted, the bankrupt's power to avoid a lien would not
be completely circumvented, since under section 67a(3) the bankruptcy court is vested with discretion to determine whether the lien
shall be preserved. It is likely that preservation would be denied in
cases like Hall, where a creditor obtained a lien against exempt
wages by resorting to a forum other than that of the debtor's domicile.40
As a matter of practice, trustees have rarely invoked the lien
34. (Emphasis added.) See text quoted in note 6 supra.
35. 291 U.S. 1 (19!14), discussed in J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 229 (1956).
36. See Hemsell v. Rabb, 29 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1929), which noted that the
trustee was not a party to the action in Hall, nor did he try to preserve the lien.
But see J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 11 208, at 228-29 (1956); Countryman, supra
note 15, at 719.
37. See authorities cited in note 33 supra.
38. Countryman, supra note 15, at 718-20, takes the position that § 67a(3) should
be limited to situations where the avoidance of a lien would benefit a junior creditor
or transferee, while other commentators are in favor of expanded powers for the
trustee. See, e.g., J. MAcLActn.AN, BANKRUPTCY 1J 208, at 228-30 (1956); Kennedy, supra
note 6, at 481-84; Note, supra note l!3, at 89 (1954).
39. Hemsell -v. Rabb, 29 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1929); In re Porter, 3 F. Supp. 582
(S.D. Fla. 1933).
40. See 4 w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1111 67.02, at 19 Bi: 67.15, at 163 {1967); Kennedy,
supra note 6, at 483.
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preservation provision of section 67a(3), except when avoidance of a
lien would give a junior creditor or transferee a windfall.41 However, the court in the principal case did acknowledge the possibility
that if a lien had been obtained during the four-month period, it
might have been either preserved for the benefit of the estate or
avoided by the bankrupt.42 Since no lien had in fact been obtained,
the court was not called upon to decide which of these two rights
would prevail, and it limited itself to reconciling the policies of
Lockwood and Hall.
The principal case narrowly construed Lockwood to authorize
the bankruptcy court to gTant a creditor a stay to establish a lien in
a nonbankruptcy court only if the creditor's right to the otherwise
exempt property has been acquired by contract or express waiver
of exemption. It has generally been held that a judicial lien obtained
by such a creditor cannot be voided under section 67a(l); 43 nor can it
be preserved for the benefit of the estate by the court under section
67a(3).44 However, virtually all other types of liens obtained by
creditors on exempt property have been held voidable by the
bankrupt or the trustee. 45 In the principal case, the court reasoned
that a stay should not be granted to obtain a lien in the latter category, since such a stay would have no other effect than that of delaying discharge.46
As discussed above, 47 there are policy reasons for both approval
and criticism of .the court's decision to limit the use of Lockwood
stays and to deny the bank and other similar creditors the right to
assert claims against property not exempt as to them under state law.
It has been suggested that Congress should amend section 6 of the
41. See 4 w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1J 67.16, at 178 (1967); Kennedy, supra note 6,
at 482; Comment, supra note 16, at 1485. For the only two exceptions to this limited
application, see cases cited in note 39 supra.
42. Principal case at 418.
43. This was the rule prior to Lockwood and it is still followed today. See, e.g.,
In re Jackson, 116 F. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Dockery v. Flanary, 194 Va. 318, 73 S.E.2d 375
(1952), discussed in Note, supra note 33. See also principal case at 417.
44. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 116 F. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Kennedy, supra note 6, at 482.
45. Principal case at 417. Some cases, however, have held that the bankrupt may
not avoid liens on property abandoned by the trustee. See, e.g., Sample v. Jackson,
225 N.C. 380, 35 S.E.2d 236 (1945). See generally 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1111 67.15[2],
at 172-73 & 370.42[4], at 515 (1967).
46. See note 6 supra. It should be noted, however, that liens arising from statutes,
usually designed to protect certain occupational groups, as well as judicial liens obtained
more than four months preceding bankruptcy, may be valid against the trustee as well
as against the bankrupt without legal or equitable proceedings. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 67b
& c, 11 u.s.c. §§ 107(b) & (c) (1964). See also 4 w. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 67.20·.281,
at 208-470 (1967). Under these statutes creditors do not have to employ state judicial
machinery in order to perfect their rights against property of the bankrupt, and
therefore recognition of these liens does not require a delay of the bankruptcy proceedings.
47. See notes 24·32 supra and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Act to clarify the status of exempt property which is
subject to the claims of special creditors.48 In the absence of such an
amendment, the principal case strikes a reasonable balance between
the countervailing considerations. State laws as to exceptions are
abrogated only when a creditor obtains a lien within four months of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or attempts to stay the discharge proceedings in order to obtain a lien. Although the courts
should not frustrate the congressional policy of deference to differing state law, it is submitted that the court was correct in deciding
that creditors should not be able to take advantage of state exceptions to exemptions after bankruptcy or within four months preceding the filing of the petition. In ruling as it did the court properly
implemented the federal policy of hostility to races of diligence.49
It also eliminated the preferential treatment that excepted creditors
could obtain if they were allowed first to share in the distribution of
the bankrupt's estate and thereafter to exploit their special statutory
privileges against the debtor's exempt property.50
Since most states have greatly restricted the right of creditors to
obtain waivers of exemption by contract, after the principal case
Lockwood stays will be available only in unusual cases. 51 However,
the narrow construction given to Lockwood by the opinion in the
principal case does not mean that the court failed to give due respect
to the Supreme Court ruling. The primary problem in Lockwood
was determining which courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
to exempt property; after holding that this jurisdiction lies in nonbankruptcy courts, the Supreme Court merely authorized the bankruptcy court to grant a creditor a stay if state policy and procedure
afforded him a remedy as to the exempt property. It is submitted that
the court in the principal case was correct in ruling that, despite
Lockwood, it could and should deny a stay, given the facts with
which it was presented. Whether there are sufficient equities in
favor of creditors holding express waivers of exemption52 to justify
48. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 486, suggests this possible amendment to § 6 of the
Bankruptcy Act:
Provided further, that the rights of any unsecured creditor having a claim
provable under this act, other than a claimant for alimony, maintenance, or
support, against property which the bankrupt is otherwise entitled to claim as
exempt may be enforced in the bankruptcy proceedings by the trustee for the
benefit of the estate.
49. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 21 supra.
52. The Hall court was of the view that neither the bankrupt nor the trustee could
avoid a waiver lien, but it gave no particular reason for this other than a reference to
Lockwood. 229 U.S. at 516. Possibly the Court reasoned that once a bankrupt has
waived his exemption, be is estopped to avoid the waiver holder's lien. See Note,
supra note l!3, at 93.

Michigan Law Review

[V/ol. 6

the suspension of bankruptcy proceedings to permit such creditors
to enforce their claims against property set apart as exempt is a
question which deserves re-examination by the Supreme Court in an
appropriate case.

